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I.

INTRODUCTION

Marijuana legalization has been one of the most polarizing legal issues in the country
over the past two decades.1 In 1996, California became the first state to legalize medical
marijuana through State Proposition 215, or more commonly known as the Compassionate
Use Act.2 In the following twenty years, twenty-nine other states, plus Washington D.C.,
followed suit by passing their own marijuana legalization laws.3 And just over a year ago,
Oklahoma became the thirtieth state to join the cannabis legalization party by passing State
Question 788²giving medical marijuana the green light in a traditionally red state.4 Fast
forward to 2020 and thirty-three states have legalized medical marijuana, while eleven
have legalized its recreational use.5 Changes in the general stigma attached to the drug,
and political ideologies from both sides of the aisle that lend support to its intrastate
legalization have moELOL]HGWKHFRXQWU\¶VWKRXJKWVRQWKHSODQWWKDWZDVRQFHSURKLELWHG
across all fifty states.6
Change in marijuana policy and ideology has brought on additional issues that
confront a wide range of individuals and entities. Employers that were once permitted to
fire employees for cause relating to any drug related offenses prior to medical marijuana
becoming legal in their states now face pressure to consider employees¶ newly-acquired
rights when evaluating company drug use policies. 7 Financial institutions are limited by

1. See generally Dennis A. Rendleman, Ethical Issues in Representing Clients in the Cannabis Business:
“One Toke Over The Line?”, 26 PROF. LAWYER No. 1 (July 2, 2019) (discussing state-level marijuana
legalization with other polarizing political issues such as sanctuary cities, gun restriction laws, and civil rights).
2. Sarah Trumble, Timeline of State Marijuana Legalization Laws, THIRD WAY (last updated Apr. 19, 2017),
https://www.thirdway.org/infographic/timeline-of-state-marijuana-legalization-laws.
3. Id.
4. Oklahoma State Question 788, Medical Marijuana Legislation Initiative (June 2018), BALLOTPEDIA (last
visited
Sept.
4,
2020),
https://ballotpedia.org/Oklahoma_State_Question_788,_Medical_Marijuana_Legalization_Initiative_(June_20
18).
5. Tom Murse, States Where Smoking Recreational Marijuana Is Legal, THOUGHT CO. (last updated Feb.
4, 2020), https://www.thoughtco.com/states-that-legalized-marijuana-3368391.
6. Trip Gabriel, Legalizing Marijuana, With a Focus on Social Justice, Unites 2020 Democrats, NY TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/17/us/politics/marijuana-legalize-democrats.html
(discussing ideologies from both the democratic and republican platforms that support state-level marijuana
legalization).
7. See Noffsinger v. SSC Niantic Operating Co., 273 F. Supp. 3d 326 (Conn. 2017) (Holding a provision of
Connecticut¶s Palliative Use of Marijuana Act (PUMA) that prohibits an employer from discriminating against
authorized individuals using marijuana outside the workplace provides a right of private action and does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause); H.B. 2612, 57th leg. (Okla. 2019); see also Dale L. Deitchler & Nancy N.
Delogu, In Oklahoma, Medical Use of Marijuana Is OK, But Employers Now Have Enhanced Rights to Act,
LITTLER WORKPLACE POLICY INST. (Mar. 20, 2019), https://www.littler.com (Click on the menu icon at the top
right corner of the home page and a search option will come up. In the search box, tySH³,Q2NODKRPD0HGLFDO
Use of Marijuana Is OK, But Employers Now Have Enhanced Rights to AcW´ (discussing Oklahoma¶s Unity

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol56/iss1/8

2

Kendrick: Blazed and Confused: The Hazy Legal Ethics of the Cannabis Craze

2020]

BLAZED AND CONFUSED

145

federal banking and money laundering laws when it comes to providing services to
cannabis businesses due to the drug remaining federally illegal.8 Burdensome expenses,
mandatory suspicious activity reports, and a minefield of other complicated rules and
regulations deter most banks and accountants from getting involved with cannabis cash.9
The same goes for many physicians, who, despite their professional opinion of WKHGUXJ¶V
medical benefits, remain hesitant to prescribe or even recommend it to patients because of
the ethical and legal risks involved.10
Marijuana legalization is an equally complex issue for attorneys to navigate. Acting
as a set of ethical guidelines for practicing attorneys, the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct expressly prohibit an attorney from counseling a client to engage in illegal
activity, or assisting a client in activity that the attorney knows is illegal or fraudulent. 11
Because marijuana growth and distribution is still federally illegal under the Controlled
6XEVWDQFHV $FW ³&6$´  DQG DFWLQJ XQGHU WKH FRORU RI VWDWH ODZ LV QRW D GHIHQVH WR
engaging in federally illegal conduct, attorneys thrust themselves into an ethical gray area
when they choose to take marijuana businesses as clients.12
To make matters worse, legal intrastate cannabis industries are accompanied by
some of the most complex and stringent regulatory schemes in existence.13 Ambitious
entrepreneurs looking to capitalize on this new market face the daunting task of navigating
a minefield of legal issues in a highly regulated industry before they even think about
making their first sale.14 &RPELQH WKHVH LVVXHV WR WKH &6$¶V XQFRQGLWLRQDO IHGHUDO
prohibition of marijuana,15 along with lawyers who are concerned with breaching their
ethical duties should they choose to represent a marijuana business,16 and you have a
perfect formula for a massive amount of unattended legal needs. Leaving these legal needs
XQDWWHQGHGFRXOGLQKLELWDSURPLVLQJLQGXVWU\¶VIXOOEORRP
In response to the conflict between the CSA and state marijuana legalization, many
states have either modified their Rules of Professional Conduct or have provided ethics
opinions that answer whether attorneys are permitted to represent legal intrastate
marijuana businesses, and if so, what exactly the representation may entail without
EUHDFKLQJWKHDWWRUQH\¶VHWKLFDOGXWLHV17 Certain states have taken a progressive ³client-

Bill, which provides a non-exhaustive list of ³safety sensitive´ jobs that allow employers to take an employee or
job applicant¶s medical marijuana use into consideration when the individual holds or will hold a ³safety sensitive
job´).
8. Kevin Murphy, Legal Marijuana: The $9 Billion Industry That Most Banks Won’t Touch, FORBES (Sept.
6, 2018), https://www.forbes.com FOLFNRQVHDUFKLFRQDWWKHWRSULJKWFRUQHURIKRPHSDJHDQGVHDUFK³/HJDO
Marijuana: The $9 Billion InduVWU\7KDW0RVW%DQNV:RQ¶W7RXFK´ 
9. Id.
10. Steve Hendrix, Doctors backing out of recommending medical marijuana in response to Sessions memo,
THE CANNABIST (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.thecannabist.co/2018/02/02/maryland-massachusetts-medicalmarijuana-doctorssessions/98160/.
11. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
12. See United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1167 (9th Cir. 2016).
13. See Rendleman, supra note 1.
14. Id.
15. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)(a) (2012).
16. See Rendleman, supra note 1.
17. See Wash. State Bar Ass¶n, Advisory Op. 201501 (2015); ILL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT (Ill. 2015).
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centric´ approach18 (i.e. an approach that promotes unrestricted access to attorneys) to
applying the Rules of Professional Conduct to their legalized marijuana industries.
Alternatively, other states have been hesitant to deviate from a strict textual reading of the
UXOHVZKLFKDUJXDEO\UHVWULFWVRULQFRQYHQLHQWO\FRQGLWLRQVPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVHV¶DFFHVV
to lawyers.19 However, some states, including Oklahoma, have left many attorneys in the
dark by not officially taking a clear stance on the issue.20
3DUW ,, RI WKLV FRPPHQW ZLOO H[SORUH WKH KLVWRU\ RI WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V
regulation and criminalization of marijuana and the recent development of the drug
becoming legal in some capacity under the laws of over half the states. Part III will analyze
how these states have responded to marijuana legalization through ethics opinions or
changes in their Rules of Professional Conduct. Additionally, Part III will analyze how
these opinions and rule changes have attempted to articulate permissible degrees of
representation that lawyers may provide state-legal marijuana businesses without
EUHDFKLQJWKHLUHWKLFDOGXWLHV$IWHUDFRPSDUDWLYHDQDO\VLVRIWKHVWDWHV¶UHVSRQVHVWRWKHLU
legalized marijuana industries, this Comment will recommend an approach for Oklahoma
to take that will provide attorneys adequate guidance through the ethical gray area
associated with their choice to provide services to marijuana businesses. 21 Lastly, this
Comment will explain that by implementing a ³client-centric´ approach22 to interpreting
the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Oklahoma Ethics Committee or Supreme Court can
eliminate part of this ethical gray area for Oklahoma attorneys, further the underlying
objectives of the Rules, and provide the sWDWH¶VPHGLFDOPDULMXDQDLQGXVWry an opportunity
to fully blossom.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL REGULATION AND STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION

Through the early parts of American history, growing and using marijuana was legal
under federal law and laws of the individual states. 23 From the mid-nineteenth century
WKURXJKWKHHDUO\¶VSK\VLFLDQVUHFRJQL]HGWKHGUXJIRULWVPHGLFDOYDOXHDQGXWLOL]HG
it to treat a wide range of ailments.24 During this time, marijuana was even listed in the
U.S. Pharmacopeia, a pharmaceutical publication containing the formula for the
18. See Rendleman, supra note 1 (Rendleman addresses the two primary stances on the interpretation of
Model Rule 1.2. One being a ³strict textual´ interpretation, and the other being a ³client centric´ interpretation
based on reasonableness. This Comment concurs with Rendleman¶s argument for a ³client-centric´ approach,
recommends that Oklahoma adopt this approach, and further elaborates how the approach carries out the ABA
Rules¶ objectives.).
19. Compare Wash. State Bar Ass¶n, Advisory Op. 201501 (2015), with Pa. Joint Formal Op. 2015-100
(2015).
20. Shortly after Oklahoma passed State Question 788, the Oklahoma Bar Association Rules of Professional
Conduct Committee proposed an amendment to Rule 1.2. that allowed attorneys to represent marijuana
businesses as long as the attorney advised the client regarding federal and tribal law. However, the amendment
was not adopted. See Joe Balkenbush, Ethics of Legal Marijuana in Oklahoma, 90 OKLA. B.J. 60 (2019).
21. See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 5 (2008). Oklahoma adopted the ABA Model Rules of professional
FRQGXFWLQ7KHUHIRUHDOOGLVFXVVLRQVRIWKH³$%$0RGHO5XOHV´DSSO\WR2NODKRPD7KHFUX[RIWKLV
&RPPHQW¶V DUJXPHQW LV WKDW WKH 2NODKRPD (WKLFV &RPPLWWHH VKRXOG HLWKHU LVVXH DQ RIILFLDO RSLQLRQ RU WKH
SuprePH&RXUWVKRXOGDPHQGWKHUXOHVLQOLJKWRI2NODKRPD¶VOHJDOL]HGPHGLFDOPDULMXDQDLQGXVWU\
22. See Rendleman, supra note 1.
23. Mark Eddy, Medical Marijuana: Review and Analysis of Federal and State Policies, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV. 1 (2010), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33211.pdf.
24. Id. at 1.
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preparation of drugs considered to be the most fully established and best understood at the
time.25 +RZHYHU LQ WKH PLG ¶V WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW GLG QRW SURYLGH WKH VDPH
welcomed greeting to the drug that earlier physicians had, which in effect began the
UROOHUFRDVWHUULGHWKDWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VZKLPVLFDOVWDQFHRQWKHGUXJKDVUHVHPEOHGRYHU
time.
A. Congress Goes on the Offensive in the Crusade Against Cannabis
By the end of 1936, marijuana had lost its popularity and was viewed as an accessory
associated with violent crime.26 7KHGUXJ¶VQHZLPDJHOHG&RQJUHVVWRSDVVWKH0DULKXDQD
Tax Act of 1937,27 ZKLFKZDVWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VILUVWDWWHPSWWRUHJXODWHPDULMXDQD28 The
Act imposed a registration and reporting requirement and a tax on marijuana growers,
buyers, and sellers.29 Additionally, the Act caused marijuana to drop from the Federal
Pharmacopeia, stripping it of its previously recognized medicinal value.30 Though the Act
did not expressly prohibit the production or use of marijuana, its effect was essentially the
same due to the duty imposed on users and growers to self-report.31 However, the Act was
later ruled unconstitutional because it compelled self-incrimination, and thus violated the
Fifth Amendment.32
Decades DIWHUWKH0DULKXDQD7D[$FW3UHVLGHQW1L[RQODXQFKHGWKH³:DURQ'UXJV´
campaign in response to a rise in recreational GUXJ XVH LQ WKH ¶V33 To give the
campaign legs, the government doubled down on its disapproving position on marijuana
by passing tKHLQIDPRXV&RQWUROOHG6XEVWDQFH$FW ³&6$´ RIZKLFKFDWHJRUL]HG
marijuana as a Schedule I drug.34 The CSA provided a five-tiered scheduling system that
classified drugs based primarily on their addictive potential balanced against their
medicinal value.35 Schedule I drugs have high potential for abuse and no currently
accepted medical use.36 Other examples of Schedule I drugs include heroin, LSD, and
ecstasy.37 The most significant difference between Schedule I and II drugs is that Schedule
25. Id. at 6; Nils Hagen-Frederiksen, What is a Pharmacopeia?, U.S. PHARMACOPEIA (Aug. 7, 2014),
https://qualitymatters.usp.org/what-pharmacopeia.
26. Eddy, supra note 23, at 6.
27. Christopher Ingraham, ‘Marijuana’ or ‘marihuana’? It’s all weed to the DEA, WASH. POST (Dec. 16,
2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/12/16/marijuana-or-marihuana-its-allweed-to-the-dea/ (One frequent question brought up about early cannabis legislation is why the Marihuana Tax
Act is spelled with an ³h´ instead of a ³j´ as we are used to seeing. The word¶s origin is Mexican-Spanish, which
spells it with an ³h,´ while the Americanized spelling of the word is with a ³j.´ However, some jurisdictions still
regularly use the ³h´ version of the spelling. Both spellings are technically correct, but if ever in doubt, just use
the word ³cannabis.´).
28. Eddy, supra note 23, at 2.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1968).
33. The
War
on
Drugs:
History
and
Facts,
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
PROGRAMS,
https://www.criminaljusticeprograms.com/articles/war-on-drugs-history-and-facts/ (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
34. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)(a) (2012).
35. German Lopez, The Federal Drug Scheduling System Explained, VOX (last updated Aug. 11, 2016),
https://www.vox.com/2014/9/25/6842187/drug-schedule-list-marijuana.
36. 21 U.S.C. § 812(1)(a).
37. See Lopez, supra note 35.
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,, GUXJV PD\ KDYH OLPLWHG XVH IRU PHGLFDO SXUSRVHV ZLWK WKH '($¶V DSSURYDO ZKLOH
Schedule I drugs are federally illegal for all purposes besides government research. 38 For
example, many ADHD medications contain amphetamine, a Schedule II drug with a high
risk of potential for abuse, which is legal in some capacities due to its recognized medical
benefits.39
The CSA additionally established punishment guidelines for individuals prosecuted
for engaging in the manufacture, distribution, and possession of Schedule I narcotics, with
punishment as severe as life imprisonment for high volume sellers and traffickers. 40
i. Lack of Firepower for Marijuana Legalization from the Federal Judiciary
7KH 86 6XSUHPH &RXUW KDV FRQVLVWHQWO\ KHOG WKDW WKH &6$¶V SURKLELWLRQ RI
marijuana preempts conflicting state laws that deem the drug legal. 41 Throughout its
Marijuana jurisprudence, the Court has established that no implied medical-necessity
H[FHSWLRQ H[LVWV WR WKH IHGHUDO JRYHUQPHQW¶V SURKLELWLRQV RQ WKH PDQXIDFWXUH DQG
distribution of marijuana.42 7KH &RXUW KDV DFNQRZOHGJHG WKDW EHFDXVH RI PDULMXDQD¶V
Schedule I status, the only exception the CSA provides for marijuana use is for government
research.43
,QWKH &RXUWSURYLGHGDGGLWLRQDODPPXQLWLRQIRUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VFUXVDGH
against marijuana in its decision in Gonzales v. Raich.44 In this landmark case, the Court
XSKHOGWKH&6$DQGVWUXFNGRZQD&DOLIRUQLDFLWL]HQ¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWWKey had a right to
XVH PDULMXDQD IRU PHGLFLQDO SXUSRVHV XQGHU &DOLIRUQLD¶V &RPSDVVLRQDWH 8VH $FW 45
Gonzales DIILUPHGWKHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQW¶VSUHHPSWLYHSRZHUVWRUHJXODWHFDQQDELVXVH
even when it is produced and used in compliance with state laws. 46
TKH1LQWK&LUFXLWPDLQWDLQHGWKH&6$¶VSUHHPSWLRQRYHUVWDWHPHGLFDOPDULMXDQD
laws in United States v. McIntosh, but acknowledged the limitations that congressional
appropriations to spending bills inflict on the 'HSDUWPHQWRI-XVWLFH¶V ³DOJ´ ability to
prosecute individuals complying with state law. 47 In McIntosh, the court reviewed a
consolidation of cases that dealt with the government prosecuting individuals in California

38. Id.
39. Sharon Liao, Why Are ADHD Medicines Controlled Substances?, WEBMD (May 10, 2017),
https://www.webmd.com/add-adhd/features/adhd-medicines-controlled-substances#1.
40. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012).
41. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers¶ Co-op, 532
U.S. 483 (2001).
42. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Co-op, 532 U.S. at 484.
43. Id.; Paul Armentano, The federal government must stop stifling medical marijuana research, THE HILL
(Sept. 14, 2018, 3:30 PM), https://thehill.com (In the search icon at the top right corner of the home page, type
³7KHIHGHUDOJRYHUQPHQWPXVWVWRSVWLIOLQJPHGLFDOPDULMXDQDUHVHDUFK´ (The DEA is currently blocking 25
medical marijuana research applications. Since 1962, the only federally recognized marijuana research facility is
the University of Mississippi, and experts contend that the facilities and product are inadequate to achieve
legitimate research results. As they stand, the federal hurdles to clinical cannabis research are ³unduly onerous´,
and have been called upon by law makers to be abolished. Without adequate approved government research,
marijuana¶s legal status will remain stagnant.).
44. Raich, 545 U.S. at 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 8±10.
47. See 833 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2016).
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for marijuana offenses.48 The defendants pointed to a rider that Congress had recently
attached to an omnibus spending bill that prohibited the DOJ from using its funds to
prevent states from implementing their own medical marijuana laws. 49 The court struck
GRZQ WKH '2-¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW LW ZDV QRW SUHYHQWLQJ VWDWHV IURP LPSOHPHQWLQJ WKeir
marijuana laws by using funds to prosecute individuals, as opposed to the state itself. 50
However, the McIntosh court noted that individuals who do not strictly comply with all
state law conditions regarding the use, distribution, possession, and cultivation of medical
marijuana have engaged in unauthorized conduct and therefore are subject to prosecution
by the DOJ.51
'HVSLWHWKH&6$¶VSUHHPSWLRQRYHUVWDWHPDULMXDQDODZV&RQJUHVVVWLOOPDLQWDLQV
LWVDXWKRULW\WRDOORFDWHRUUHVWULFWWKH'2-¶VIXQGV for prosecuting marijuana offenses in
states where it is legal.52 When an appropriations act prohibits the DOJ from using its
funds to prevent states from implementing their own medical marijuana laws, the DOJ is
barred from utilizing its funds to prosecute individuals that can demonstrate their
marijuana use was in compliance with state law.53
B. Full Steam Ahead: The States Challenge the CSA by Passing Their Own Marijuana
Laws.
0DULMXDQDDGYRFDWHVZKRORQJFDOOHGIRUWKHGUXJ¶VOHJDOL]DWLRQFDQODUJHly thank
the concept of federalism, and perhaps the audacity of law makers in the first few states
that legalized the drug, for the impressive traction that the movement for marijuana
legalization has gained over time. Whether through statute adoption, state referenda, or
ballot measure, constituents in states that voted in favor of state marijuana legalization
would soon put the federal government on notice that the CSA would not go unchallenged.
i. Blazing the Trail: CaliforQLD¶V&RPSDVVLRQDWH8VH$FW6SDUNHGWKH0RYHPHQW
for Marijuana Legalization
In 1996, California became the first state to allow marijuana use for medical
purposes through State Proposition 215, which would come to be known as the
Compassionate Use Act.54 The Act was considered a victory for medical marijuana
proponents and was passed by more than an 11% margin.55 In effect, patients and defined
caregivers were permitted to possess and cultivate marijuana for doctor-recommended
medical treatment and would not be subject to criminal laws which otherwise prohibit such

48. Id.
49. Id. at 1177 (referencing the rider Congress attached to the 2015 omnibus spending bill, which provides,
³None of the funds made available in this Act to the [DOJ] may be used, with respect to [states with medicalmarijuana laws], to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws that authorize the use,
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical marijuana.´).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. 833 F.3d at 1179.
53. Id.
54. California Proposition 215, The Medical Marijuana Initiative (1996), BALLOTPEDIA (last visited Mar.
10, 2019), https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_215,_the_Medical_Marijuana_Initiative_(1996).
55. Id.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

7

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 8

TULSA LAW REVIEW

150

[Vol. 56:143

acts.56 7KH³UHFRPPHQGHG´ODQJXDJHZDVFUXFLDODVGRFWRUVZKRZRXOGULVNORVLQJWKHLU
license for prescribing cannabis to a patient could merely recommend the drug for medical
purposes and discuss its benefits without fear of punishment. 57
ii. One Step Forward: The Obama Administration and the Ogden Memo Ignite an
,GHRORJLFDO5HYROXWLRQDWWKH1DWLRQ¶V&DSLWDODQGLQ6WDWHVZLWK/HJDO
Cannabis Markets
3UHVLGHQW %DUDFN 2EDPD¶V HOHFWLRQ ZDV D KXJH turning point for the medical
marijuana industry. The Obama Administration DOJ suggested that it would loosen the
VWDQGDUGVRIWKH%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VPRUHVWULQJHQWVWDQFHRQPDULMXDQD58 Additionally,
the administration advised U.S. Attorneys against devoting resources to prosecuting
medical marijuana users and suppliers acting in compliance with their state laws. 59
In October of 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden released the infamous
³2JGHQ0HPR´ZKLFKHODERUDWHGRQWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V more relaxed policy on
marijuana.60 The Memorandum, which addressed attorneys and prosecutors in states
where marijuana had been legalized, concerned the allocation of federal prosecution
UHVRXUFHVDQGVHWIRUWKUHFRPPHQGHGJXLGHOLQHVSURYLGLQJ³$VDJHneral matter, pursuit
of [federal] priorities should not focus federal resources in your States on individuals
whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state laws providing
IRU WKH PHGLFDO XVH RI PDULMXDQD´61 The Ogden Memo was significant because some
interpreted it to narrow the scope of CSA enforcement policy.62
7KH2JGHQ0HPR¶VHIIHFWRQWKHPDULMXDQDLQGXVWU\ZDVSURIRXQG$OWKRXJKSDUWV
of the memo cautioned against an apathetic view towards federal law, 63 many people,
perhaps prematurely, saw it as the government taking a laissez faire approach to marijuana
regulation in states where it had been legalized.64 7KH PDULMXDQD LQGXVWU\¶V JURZWK LQ
California and Colorado was particularly explosive. Citizens saw a handful of dispensaries
multiply into thousands by 2010.65

56. Id.
57. Edwin Chemerinsky, Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 85
(2015) (citing Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 632, 638±39 (9th Cir. 2003)).
58. Eddy, supra note 23, at 11 (discussing the public reaction to the FDA¶s 2006 statement on marijuana¶s
lack of medical benefits).
59. Barack Obama ‘To Overturn’ Bush Era Cannabis Policy, THE TELEGRAPH (Oct. 18, 2009, 11:18 PM),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/barackobama/6373683/Barack-Obama-tooverturn-Bush-eracannabis-policy.html.
60. Memorandum IURP 'HSXW\ $WW¶\ *HQ 'DYLG * 2JGHQ WR Selected U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 19, 2009)
(available
at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/blog/memorandum-selected-unitedstate-attorneysinvestigations-and-prosecutions-states).
61. Id.
62. Id. (providing that ³[p]rosecution of individuals with cancer or other serious illnesses who use marijuana
as part of a recommended treatment regimen consistent with applicable state law . . . is unlikely to be an efficient
use of limited federal resources.´).
63. Id. (³Of course, no State can authorize violations of federal law, and the list of factors above is not
intended to describe exhaustively when a federal prosecution may be warranted.´).
64. Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 86±87.
65. Id. at 87.
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iii. Two Steps Back: The Cole and Sessions Memos Send the Ogden Memo Up in
6PRNHDQG&ORXG\WKH8QGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V6WDQFHRQ&6$
Enforcement
In 2011, Deputy Attorney General James Cole released the first of his three followup memos to the Ogden Memo regarding CSA enforcement in response to the rapidly
expanding marijuana industry.66 The 2011 Memo rebutted the belief that the Ogden Memo
would shield marijuana manufactures, transporters, and other users from federal
prosecution, and clarified that federal law and the CSA still preempted any state law that
legalized marijuana.67 7KH&ROH0HPRH[SODLQHGWKDWWKH2JGHQ0HPR¶VSXUSRVHZDVWR
assist in allocating prosecution resources efficiently and that the DOJ was still committed
to fully enforcing the CSA.68
In August of 2013, Cole further detailed CSA enforcement in his second
memorandum. The 2013 Memo set forth eight specific enforcement priorities that were
intended to prevent activities ranging from cartel and criminal enterprise involvement in
the marijuana industry, to marijuana sales to minors.69
Less than a year later, the DOJ issued an additional memo that addressed financial
institutions providing services to marijuana businesses.70 The DOJ warned that financial
institutions engaging in transactions involving proceeds deriving from marijuana
businesses or marijuana related conduct would subject the institutions to liability under
preexisting money laundering statutes.71 6RRQ DIWHU WKH 'HSDUWPHQW RI 7UHDVXU\¶V
)LQDQFLDO&ULPHV(QIRUFHPHQW1HWZRUN ³)LQ&(1´ LVVXHGDVHWRIJXLGHOLQHVWRILQDQFLDO
institutions wishing to take on marijuana businesses as clients. 72 The Guidelines were
intended to enhance the availability of financial services and transparency for state-legal
marijuana businesses, while also outlining an approach for financial institutions to comply
with the eight enforcement priorities issued in the Cole Memos. 73 The Cole Memos, the
DOJ Banking Memo, and the FinCEN Guidelines provided marijuana businesses a degree

66. Memorandum IURP'HSXW\$WW¶\*HQ-DPHV0&ROHWRU.S. Attorneys (June 29, 2011) (available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/dag-guidance2011-for-medical-marijuanause.pdf).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Memorandum IURP'HSXW\$WW¶\*HQ-Dmes M. Cole to All U.S. Attorneys (Aug. 29, 2013) (available
at https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf) (providing that U.S. attorneys
should allocate their prosecutorial resources according to the following eight priorities: (1) preventing the
distribution of marijuana to minors; (2) preventing revenue of marijuana sales from going to criminal enterprises,
gangs, and cartels; (3) preventing the diversion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state law in some
form to other states; (4) preventing state-authorized marijuana activity from being used as a cover or pretext for
the trafficking of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; (5) preventing violence and the use of firearms in
the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; (6) preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of other
adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; (7) preventing the growing of marijuana on
public lands and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public
lands; and (8) preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property).
70. Memorandum IURP'HSXW\$WW¶\*HQ-DPHV0&ROHWR$OO U.S. Attorneys (Feb. 14, 2014) (available
at https://dfi.wa.gov/documents/banks/dept-of-justice-memo.pdf).
71. Id.
72. See generally FIN. CRIMES ENF¶T NETWORK, BSA EXPECTATIONS REGARDING MARIJUANA-RELATED
BUSINESS (2014).
73. Id. at 1.
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of comfort by allowing the businesses to ascertain how the DOJ would handle state laws
conflicting with the CSA.74 However, whatever world of comfort that was believed to
exist would soon be shaken to its core by the Trump administration.
In 2018, the Trump administration DOJ dropped a bombshell on the marijuana
industry when Attorney General Jeff Sessions issued a memo that expressly withdrew the
Ogden, Cole, and Banking Memos.75 7KH 6HVVLRQV 0HPR UHLWHUDWHG WKH '2-¶V
commitment to established principles that govern all federal prosecutions, and warned that
marijuana offenses would be prosecuted in the same manner as other federal offenses.76
The Memo instructed U.S. Attorneys to prosecute marijuana offenses pursuant to the
principles in the U.S. $WWRUQH\¶V +DQGERRN ZKLFK PHUHO\ HVWDEOLVKHV WKH OHYHO RI
discretion each U.S. Attorney possesses.77 While prosecutorial discretion has always been
a power U.S. Attorneys possess, the Ogden and Cole Memos deterred federal prosecutors
from taking free reign to prosecute any marijuana entity they desired.78 In effect, the
Sessions Memo expanded U.S. $WWRUQH\V¶GLVFUHWLRQWRSURVHFXWHPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVHV
resulting in a high degree of uncertainty for the industry.79
The Sessions Memo sent many in the marijuana industry into panic mode, as the
Ogden and Cole Memos were seen as critical governmental interjections that enabled the
LQGXVWU\¶V JURZWK80 In particular, marijuana business owners in California feared they
were being put on notice because the Memo was released shortly after California enacted
legislation that legalized recreational marijuana use.81 Additionally, the Memo put
financial institutions working with marijuana-business clients in the dark due to the
)LQ&(1*XLGHOLQHV¶UHOLDQFHRQWKH&ROHDQGBanking Memos.82
The Sessions Memo was greeted with extreme opposition from lawmakers of states,
DQG WKH VWUHQJWK RI PDULMXDQD¶V TXDVL-legal status seemed to be withering away.83
However, the Memos were somewhat limited because they only provided guidance for
investigating and prosecuting criminal offenses. The Memos were silent on civil and
regulatory penalties, forfeitures, and other non-criminal penalties. If the Memo shielded
cannabis businesses from any sort of legal liability, it was only from criminal prosecutions.
The takeaway from the gRYHUQPHQW¶VVHHPLQJO\LQconsistent agenda on prosecuting
marijuana offenses is that the cannabis industry is hyper-sensitive to even the smallest
FKDQJHVLQWKH'2-¶V&6$HQIRUFHPHQWVWUDWHJ\,QGHHGVWDWHPHQWVIURPWKHgovernment
in the form of memos to federal prosecutors have a direct effect on anybody connected to

74. Hilary Bricken, Reading The Pot Leaves: What The Sessions Memo Means For Marijuana In The U.S.,
ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 8, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://abovethelaw.com (In the search icon at the top right corner of
WKHKRPHSDJHW\SH³5HDGLQJWKH3RW/HDYHV:KDWWKH6HVVLRQV0HPR0HDQVIRU0DULMXDQDLQWKH86´ .
75. Memorandum frRP $WW¶\ *HQ -HII 6HVVLRQV WR $OO U.S. Attorneys (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-issues-memo-marijuana-enforcement.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See Bricken, supra note 74.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 11362.1 (West 2017).
82. See Bricken, supra note 74.
83. Id.
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state-legal marijuana markets.84 When the government issues statements that could be
interpreted as a plan to prosecute these businesses, the market is negatively affected, and
at times sent into a state of hysteria due to apprehension from entrepreneurs to keep
investing in and developing at-risk businesses.85 Alternatively, signs of apathy or
GHIHUHQFH WR VWDWH ODZ FDQ LQYLJRUDWH VWDWHV¶ PDULMXDQD PDUNHWV DQG EULQJ D VHQVH RI
optimism to business owners and investors²but some marijuana business owners remain
indifferent either way.86 In sum, uncertainty surrounding the gRYHUQPHQW¶Vprosecutorial
philosophy regarding marijuana offenses has SRWHQWLDOWREULQJD³PDNHKD\ZKHQWKHVXQ
LV VKLQLQJ´ RU SHUKDSV ³JURZ KHUE ZKLOH WKH JRYHUQPHQW LVQ¶W ZDWFKLQJ´ PHQWDOLW\ WR
many marijuana business owners. The next section will discuss the concerns this has
brought to attorneys considering providing legal services to marijuana businesses.
III. LAWYERING UP: SIGNIFICANT LEGAL ISSUES CONFRONTING THE MARIJUANA
INDUSTRY
State-legalized marijuana industries are some of the most highly regulated industries
in existence. Issues such as banking, taxing, zoning ordinances, business transactions, and
other local regulations create a minefield of legal issues for start-up marijuana
businesses.87
There are two distinct kinds of representation that marijuana businesses seek from
attorneys, and each of these representations create different amounts of ethical risk for the
attorney. On one hand, a lawyer does not assume much risk when their representation is
limited to pure legal advice.88 A lawyer may safely advise the client on the legal
ramifications of a proposed course of action.89 Even if the client goes on to engage in
conduct that is against federal law after receiving the advice, the lawyer will not be
personally liable.90 On the other hand, the attorney could be exposed to professional
misconduct liability when the representation goes beyond giving advice, and involves
transactions furthering the operation of the business.91 Providing this degree of
representation arguably constitutes an act aiding and abetting a federally-illegal business,
which in effect exposes the attorney to more ethical liability.92
Even under the presumption that representing a marijuana business does not
constitute an ethical breach, attorneys must still navigate the complexities of handling
payment from marijuana businesses. Because marijuana is federally illegal, federally
chartered banks cannot accept marijuana businesses as customers.93 Even most state

84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. See generally Cloudi Mornings v. City of Broken Arrow, 454 P.3d 753 (Okla. 2019) (holding a city is
authorized to implement zoning provisions so long as they do not unduly restrict or change zoning as to prevent
retail marijuana businesses from opening); Chemerinsky, supra note 57, at 90±99; Rendleman, supra note 1.
88. Bruce E. Reinhart, Up in Smoke or Down in Flames?, 90 FLA. B.J. 20, 25 (2016).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
90. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
91. Reinhart, supra note 88, at 24.
92. Id.
93. See Murphy, supra note 8.
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reserve banks operating in a state where marijuana has been legalized are hesitant to accept
money from marijuana businesses. 94 Additionally, credit card companies do not provide
services for marijuana transactions.95 As a result, marijuana businesses extensively
operate with cash.96 Federal law requires banks, lawyers, and other businesses to report
cash transactions that exceed $10,000, and failure to do so could result in prosecution or
monetary penalties.97
Furthermore, federal money laundering laws apply to many common transactions
with legal marijuana businesses. Taking payment in excess of $10,000 from a known
marijuana business may be a federal crime punishable by up to ten years in prison, and
engaging in a transaction for the purpose of furthering a known marijuana business may
be a federal crime punishable by up to twenty years in prison.98 For example, an
accountant who receives payment for providing services to a legal marijuana business
could be violating federal money laundering statutes.99 By that same logic, an attorney
who is compensated over $10,000 for drafting a contract with their marijuana business
FOLHQW¶VVXSpliers could be personally liable for violating federal money laundering laws.
Funds obtained from a marijuana business are subject to forfeiture if the recipient of the
funds knows that they are from an illegal source, and the fact that the attorney provided
fair-value services in exchange for the payment does not render the attorney immune from
forfeiture.100
In sum, attorneys contemplating the decision to provide services to marijuana
businesses are confronted with significant professional responsibility considerations, and
once the attorney-client relationship is invoked these considerations only start to pile on
more.
A. An Ethical Haze: The ABA Model Rules Create an Ethical Gray Area for Attorneys
Representing Marijuana Businesses
The ABA Model Rules define the relationship between attorneys and individuals
who consult them for legal advice, providing that someone who consults a lawyer about
possibly forming an attorney-client relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective
client.101 However, a prospective client does not necessarily trigger the full attorney-client
privilege or other implications of the relationship.102 Both the attorney and prospective
client are entitled to decide whether to proceed with forming the relationship. 103
When an attorney does choose to represent a client, the representation is limited and
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (civil penalties for failure to file report of transactions over $10,000); 31 U.S.C. § 5322
(criminal penalties for failure to file report of cash transactions over $10,000).
98. 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (illegal to engage or attempt to engage in a monetary transaction in criminally derived
property of a value greater than $10,000); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (illegal to engage in a transaction of more than
$10,000 with intent to further or promote unlawful activity).
99. Reinhart, supra note 88, at 24.
100. Id.
101. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.18(a) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
102. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.18 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
103. Id.
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LV QRW DQ HQGRUVHPHQW RI WKH FOLHQW¶V SROLWLFDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO RU PRUDO YLHZV DQG
activities.104 5HJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUWKHDWWRUQH\HQGRUVHVWKHLUFOLHQW¶VSRVLWLRQOawyers
are required to exercise independent professional judgment and provide candid advice. 105
Though lawyers typically should consider legal principles in giving such advice, the Model
Rules provide a list of non-legal factors for consideration in client consultation, including
PRUDO HFRQRPLF VRFLDO DQG SROLWLFDO IDFWRUV WKDW FRXOG KDYH UHOHYDQFH WR WKH FOLHQW¶V
situation.106
Additionally, the commentary of the Model Rules provides that a lawyer should seek
to improve the law and access to the legal system.107 When read alone, these provisions
could possibly be taken as support for lawyers being able to comfortably assist marijuana
businesses with their legal needs. However, the existing conflict between state and federal
law on the matter still creates a dilemma for lawyers wishing to represent cannabis
businesses without breaching their ethical duties.
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit lawyers from counseling
or assisting a client in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent.108
Specifically, ABA Model Rule 1.2(d) reads:
A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that the lawyer
knows is criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any
proposed course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a client to make a good
faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.109

Comment nine of this rule further elaborates on this prohibition, providing:
This prohibition, however, does not preclude the lawyer from giving an honest opinion about
WKHDFWXDOFRQVHTXHQFHVWKDWDSSHDUOLNHO\WRUHVXOWIURPDFOLHQW¶VFRQGXFW1RUGRHs the fact
that a client uses advice in a course of action that is criminal or fraudulent of itself make a
lawyer a party to the course of action.110

The main substance of debates pertaining to Rule 1.2 has been whether to strictly
interpret the text of the rule, thus enforcing it as it stands, or to interpret the rule more
progressively LQ HIIHFW FUHDWLQJ D PRUH ³FOLHQW-FHQWULF´ VWDQGDUG EDVHG RQ
reasonableness.111 In the context of intrastate marijuana, a client-centric approach to
interpreting and applying Rule 1.2 would primarily concern the legal needs of marijuana
businesses and their access to attorneys, and less on strict adherence to a rigid, textual
interpretation of the rule.
In essence, a strict reading of Rule 1.2 ethically prohibits lawyers from representing
marijuana businesses. One could argue that a strict reading of the Rule would infer the
only clearly permissible action the attorney is allowed to take in such a meeting is to advise
the client about the legal consequences resulting from running the business. A strict

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
Id.
Id.
See Rendleman, supra note 1.
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reading of the Rule could also lead to an inference that a lawyer is prohibited from
providing assistance to a start-up marijuana business in the form of negotiating business
deals and drafting contracts. Comment nine further elaborates on this point by pointing out
WKH ³FULWLFDO GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ SUHVHQWLng an analysis of legal aspects of questionable
conduct and recommending the means by which a crime or fraud might be committed with
LPSXQLW\´112
While bar associations and supreme courts of some states with legal cannabis
industries have addressed this dilemma through their own rule modifications or ethics
opinions,113 other states, including Oklahoma, have yet to take a stance on the application
and interpretation of Rule 1.2. Inconsistent opinions and rule changes have only further
muddied the waters for states entertaining the idea of legalizing marijuana.
L$V³5XOHVRI5HDVRQ´WKH$%$5XOHVRI3URIHVVLRQDO&RQGXFWAre Elastic
Enough to Accommodate Modern Legal Developments
While Rule 1.2 provides that a lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist
a client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent, it also makes a crucial
distinction between providing or recommending the means for a client to engage in
criminal or fraudulent conduct and providing a legal analysis that addresses the legal
implications of a questionable course of action; the former being prohibited by the Model
Rules.114 $GGLWLRQDOO\5XOHDSSOLHVD³JRRGIDLWK´SURYLVLRQWRDWWRUQH\VLQWHUSUHWLQJ
and applying the law in order to effectively counsel or assist a client with a particular
course of conduct.115 This provision acknowleGJHVWKDWVRPHWLPHVDQDWWRUQH\¶VHIIRUWWR
determine the interpretation or validity of a law might require the disobedience of a statute
or regulation or the interpretation placed on it by the government. 116 The good faith
provision arguably establishes a twilight zone where attorneys can use discretion in the
ethical gray area that accompanies representing marijuana business clients. Because of the
conflict between state and federal law, an attorney who provides a client services relating
to the state law and local regulatory dynamics of managing a state-legal marijuana business
arguably falls directly in line with this provision.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct ³DUe designed to provide guidance to
lawyers and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies[,]´
such as state bar associations.117 In a constantly evolving profession, the Rules are far
from black and white or set in stone²as demonstrated by the ABA committee providing:
In balancing the need to preserve the good with the need for improvement, we were mindful
RI7KRPDV-HIIHUVRQ¶VZRUGVRIQHDUO\\HDUVDJRLQDOHWWHUFRQFHUQLQJWKH9LUJLQLD
&RQVWLWXWLRQWKDW³PRGHUDWHLPSHUIHFWLRQVKDGEHWWHUEHERUQHZLWKEHFDXVHZKHQRQFH
known, we accommodate ourselves to them, and find practical means of correcting their ill

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
See, e.g., Ariz. Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011); OHIO RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d)(2) (2019).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) cmt. 9 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d) cmt. 12 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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HIIHFWV´118

7KH $%$ 0RGHO 5XOHV DUH SXUSRUWHG WR EH ³UXOHV RI UHDVRQ´ DQG RQH RI WKHLU
primary functions is to control the image of lawyers in the public eye by maintaining the
integrity of the profession.119 The ABA committee quote lends support to this idea and
the notion that the Rules are elastic enough to accommodate legal evolution. With this
SULQFLSOHLQPLQGVRPHVWDWHV¶EDUDVVRFLDWLRQVKDYHWDNHQWKHOLEHUW\RIDPHQGLQJWKHLU
own rules or issuing opinions that define the scope of the rules to accommodate intrastate
marijuana legalization.120 These modern changes, along with the progressive philosophy
of the ABA Ethics Committee shown in the Thomas Jefferson quote, arguably highlight
the flexibility of the Model Rules and demonstrate their ability to accommodate modern
issues.
LL7KH³&OLHQW-&HQWULF´6ROXWLRQ$UL]RQD&RORUDGRDQG:DVKLQJWRQ$PRQJ
Other States, Issued Ethics Opinions That Promote Marijuana BXVLQHVV¶
Access to Lawyers
In 2011, Arizona became the first state to author an ethics opinion weighing in on
Rule 1.2 in response to the enactment of its medical marijuana act.121 The opinion
provided that a lawyer does not violate $UL]RQD¶V Rules of Professional Conduct when
assisting or advising a client under the Medical Marijuana Act, but that they must inform
the client that their conduct may be in violation of federal law under the CSA. 122 The
opinion additionally provided:
[W]e decline to interpret and apply [ABA Model Rule 1.2 (d)] in a manner that would
SUHYHQW D ODZ\HU ZKR FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH FOLHQW¶V SURSRVHG FRQGXFW LV LQ µFOHDU DQG
XQDPELJXRXV FRPSOLDQFH¶ ZLWK VWDWH ODZ IURP DVVLVWLQJ WKH FOLHQW LQ FRQQHFWLRQ ZLWK
activities expressly authorized under state law, thereby depriving clients of the very legal
advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the conduct that the state law expressly
permits.123

In 2013, the Connecticut Bar Association issued a similar opinion addressing the
conflict between state law, federal law, and Rule 1.2 (d).124 &RQQHFWLFXW¶V RSLQLRQ
PLUURUHG$UL]RQD¶VLQSDUWEXWSHUKDSVZLWKPRUHUHVHUYDWLRQSURYLGLQJ³>D@WDPLQLPXP
a lawyer advising a client [on state marijuana laws] must inform the client of the conflict
between the state and federal statutes, and that the conflict exists regardless of whether
IHGHUDODXWKRULWLHVLQ&RQQHFWLFXWDUHRUDUHQRWDFWLYHO\HQIRUFLQJWKHIHGHUDOVWDWXWHV´ 125
:KLOHWKH&RQQHFWLFXW%DU$VVRFLDWLRQ¶VRSLQLRQGHHPHGLWSHUPLVVLEOHIRUDWWRUQH\VWR
DGYLVHFOLHQWVRQWKH6WDWH¶V3DOOLDWLYH8VHRI0DULMXDQD$FW¶VUHTXLUHPHQWVLWUHLWHUDWHG
that under Rule 1.2 (d) lawyers are still prohibited from assisting clients in criminal

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

ANN. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT xv (AM. BAR ASS¶N 2011).
Id.
OHIO RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d)(2) (2019).
See Ariz. Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011).
Id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
See Conn. Bar Ass¶n, Informal Op. 2013-02 (2013).
Id.
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conduct.126 Additionally, the Connecticut opinion cautioned that it was the duty of the
lawyer to draw the line where such prohibited assistance meets permissive consultation
and advisement.127
In 2014, the Florida Bar Association issued an ethics opinion that provided it would
not punish lawyers solely for advising a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning
of Florida medical marijuana laws, or for assisting a client in conduct the lawyer
reasonably believes is permitted by Florida law, as long as the lawyer also advises the
client of the conflicting federal law and policy. 128
In 2016, the Supreme Court of Illinois also made strides in dealing with the conflict
between its new marijuana legislation and ABA Model Rule 1.2 by amending its
professional conduct rules to encompass the same principle set forth in the Arizona Bar
Association¶VHWKLFVRSLQLRQ129 IllLQRLV¶DPHQGHG5XOH G DOORZVODZ\HUVWRFRXQVHO
and assist clients with conduct expressly permitted by Illinois law, even if the conduct
might conflict with or violate federal law, as long as the lawyer advises the client about
the federal law it might violate, and the potential consequences of violating it.130
To support its decision to apply a more ³client-centric´ approach to interpreting Rule
WKH,OOLQRLV%DU$VVRFLDWLRQFLWHGWKH$%$0RGHO&RGH¶VSUHDPEOHZKLFKGHVFULEHG
the model rules as ³UXOHVRIUHDVRQ´131 This decision was also in line with the primary
objectives of the ABA Model Rules, which is to ensure that regulations are conceived in
the public interest and to improve access to the legal system.132
The State of Washington implemented an even more ³client-centric´ interpretation
and application of Rule 1.2 in its 2015 ethics opinion.133 The Washington opinion laid out
a list of hypothetical questions with answers and analysis concerning the legality of certain
conduct by lawyers representing marijuana businesses.134 These questions asked whether
an attorney could remain in compliance with the Rules of Professional Conduct while: (1)
advising the client regarding interpretation and compliance of Washington Marijuana
laws; (2) assisting the client in starting up their marijuana business; (3) using marijuana
under Washington law; and (4) starting and operating their own marijuana business under
Washington law.135 The opinion determined that the lawyer could engage in all of the
aforementioned conduct without breaching their ethical duties, and provided that acting
under the color of state law protects the lawyer from engaging in or assisting a client in
conduct that might conflict with federal law.136 Additionally, the opinion provided that a
lawyer would not be engaging in professional misconduct or activity that compromised
their fitness to practice law by choosing to participate in the legalized cannabis market as
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Gary Blankenship, Board Adopts Medical Marijuana Advice Policy, THE FLORIDA BAR (June 15, 2014),
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-news/board-adopts-medical-marijuanaadvice-policy/.
129. See ILL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (Ill. 2015).
130. Id.
131. Ill. State Bar Ass¶n Prof¶l Conduct Advisory Op. 14-07 (2014).
132. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
133. See Wash. State Bar Ass¶n, Advisory Op. 201501 (2015).
134. Id. at 2±8.
135. Id. at 3.
136. Id. at 3, 6±7.
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either a customer or a businessperson.137
California, like Washington, also took an aggressive, ³client-centric´ approach to
modifying its rules in 2018. The amended rule sets forth that it is permissible for:
[a] lawyer to advise a client regarding the validity, scope, and meaning of California laws
that might conflict with federal or tribal law. In the event of such a conflict, the lawyer may
assist a client [in conduct that the lawyer reasonably believes is permitted by California
statutes, regulations, orders, and other state or local provisions implementing those laws.] If
California law conflicts with federal or tribal law, the lawyer [should also advise] the client
about related federal or tribal law and policy . . . .138

An important distinguishing factor between the California and Illinois and Florida
rules is the strength of language used for outlining how attorneys should handle
preliminary meetings with marijuana business clients. Illinois Rule 1.2(d) provides that a
lawyer may represent marijuana business as long as the lawyer informs the client of the
potential consequences stemming from its conduct being a violation of federal law.139 The
FRUUHFWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI³DVORQJDV´LVWKDWLWPDQGDWHVODZ\HUVWRLQIRUPWKHir client of
the consequences of breaking federal law while acting under the color of state law.
$OWHUQDWLYHO\ &DOLIRUQLD¶V 5XOH XVHV VOLJKWO\ ZHDNHU ODQJXDJH FRPSDUHG WR WKH ,OOLQRLV
Rule, and merely provides that a lawyer should inform their client of the potential
consequences of such conduct.140 Though the difference in the strength of language seems
PLQRUXVLQJRSWLRQDOODQJXDJHVXFKDV³VKRXOG´JLYHVDWWRUQH\VOHVVRIDQLQFHQWLYHWR
SURYLGH³FDQGLGDGYLFH,´ZKLFKWKH$%$0RGHO5XOHVPDQGDWH141
The question presented by this issue is whether a lawyer is truly satisfying their duty
to their client if they have the option of consciously withholding such advice that the
Illinois Rule makes mandatory, but the California Rule makes optional. Rule 1.1 partly
addresses this inquiry by requiring an attorney to provide competent representation, and
one of the necessary components of competence is adequate legal knowledge.142
Comments One and Two of Model Rule 2.1 also help answer this question by providing:
³[a] FOLHQWLVHQWLWOHGWRVWUDLJKWIRUZDUGDGYLFHH[SUHVVLQJWKHODZ\HU¶VKRQHVWDVVHVVPHQW
. . . . However, a lawyer should not be deterred from giving candid advice by the prospect
that the advice will be unpalatable to the client. Advice couched in narrow legal terms may
be of little value to a client, especially where practical considerations . . . are
SUHGRPLQDQW´143

Furthermore, Model Rule 1.4 requires an attorney to explain the matter to which the
representation is related to the extent necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions.144 These provisions of the Model Rules alone arguably require the attorney to
advise a marijuana business client on the implications of federal and state law conflict,

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

:DVK6WDWH%DU$VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2SDW±7 (2015).
CAL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2.1 (Cal. 2018).
ILL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (Ill. 2015).
CAL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2.1 (Cal. 2018).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 2.1 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 2.1 cmt. 1±2 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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which in turn could support the argument that mandates similar to the one provided in the
Illinois Rule are redundant and unnecessary.
7KRXJKYHUVLRQVRI5XOHOLNH&DOLIRUQLD¶VDUJXDEO\LPSRVHOHVVREOLJDWLRQVRQ
attorneys, the majority of states that have modified their Rules or issued opinions have
conditioned marijuana business representation on the lawyer informing the client of the
implications of federal law conflicts.145
iii. Pennsylvania, Maine, and Ohio Were Among States to Restrict Marijuana
BXVLQHVV¶Access to Lawyers by Issuing Ethics Opinions Supporting a Strict
Reading of Model Rule 1.2
Not all states have bought into the ³client-centric´ approach to addressing Model
Rule 1.2 the way California and Washington have. In 2015, the Pennsylvania Bar
Association released an opinion that rendered support for a strict textual approach to
interpreting Rule 1.2.146 The 3HQQV\OYDQLD %DU $VVRFLDWLRQ¶V Rpinion compared other
VWDWHV¶ SURYLVLRQVRI5XOHDQGGLVFXVVHGWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIEURDGHQLQJWKHUXOH¶VVFRSH
to accommodate marijuana legalization.147 Weary of the potential ramifications stemming
from giving attorneys the go-ahead to provide legal services to marijuana businesses,
Pennsylvania suggested a more conservative reading of the rule, providing;
Given that it is a federal crime to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess marijuana,
PA RPC 1.2 (d) forbids a lawyer from counseling or assisting a client in such conduct by,
for example, drafting or negotiating contracts for the purchase, distribution or sale of
marijuana. The fact that the proposed client conduct is permitted by state law, and federal
law enforcement may not target those operating in compliance with state law, does not
change the analysis, as the rule makes no distinction between laws that are enforced and laws
that are not.148

7KHZRUG³IRUELGV´LVHVSHFLDOO\VLJQLILFDQWEHFDXVH LWVHWVIRUWKDVWULQJHQW ]HUR
tolerance policy for lawyers involving themselves in any way with marijuana businesses.
The Pennsylvania opinion gives examples of prohibited attorney conduct, such as drafting
contracts for sales of marijuana that are legal under state law.149 Absolute compliance with
3HQQV\OYDQLD¶VVWULFWHQIRUFHPHQWRI5XOHZRXOGUHVWULFWPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVHV¶DFFHVV
to attorneys. A state rule prohibiting certain businesses from accessing legal services
VHHPVFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHWRWKH$%$¶VDVVHUWDWLRQWKDWWKH0RGHO5XOHVDUH³UXOHVRIUHDVRQ´
and runs afoul of the basic notion that everyone should have access to the legal system.
Ohio was also initially among the group of states electing for a stricter adherence to
Model Rule 1.2.150 The Ohio Board of Professional Conduct released an opinion in 2016
stating that a lawyer could not counsel or assist a client in operating a marijuana business
that was legal under state law because the lawyer possesses knowledge that such conduct

145. See ILL. RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2 (Ill. 2015); see also Wash. State Bar Ass¶n, Advisory Op.
201501 (2015); Conn. Bar Ass¶n, Informal Op. 2013-02 (2013); Ariz. Ethics Op. 11-01 (2011).
146. See Pa. Joint Formal Op. 2015-100 (2015).
147. Id. at 2, 4±8.
148. Id at 8.
149. Id.
150. See Ohio Bd. of Prof¶l Conduct Op. 2016-6 (2016).
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is illegal under federal law.151 However, shortly after the 2016 opinion was released, the
Ohio Supreme Court reviewed the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct, and made an
amendment to Rule 1.2, which now provides:
A lawyer may counsel or assist a client regarding conduct expressly permitted under [state
law] authorizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes and any state statutes, rules,
orders, or other provisions implementing the act. In these circumstances, the lawyer shall
advise the client regarding related federal law.152

The Ohio Supreme Court¶V permissive interpretation of Rule 1.2 is beneficial to
DWWRUQH\VZLVKLQJWRUHSUHVHQWPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVHVDQGUHIOHFWVWKH$%$¶VDVVHUWLRQWKDW
WKH0RGHO5XOHVDUH³UXOHVRIUHDVRQ´153 $GGLWLRQDOO\2KLR¶VUXOLQJLVLQOLQHZLWKWKH
notion that the Rules should remain flexible in response to WKHOHJDOSURIHVVLRQ¶VHYROXWLRQ
A strict interpretation of Rule 1.2, while potentially shielding lawyers from federal
liability, does not provide marijuana businesses with adequate legal recourse. This leaves
businesses vulnerable to mishaps in their startup and places them in a position where they
are a mistake or two away from being subject to federal prosecution. These mistakes could
be avoided if marijuana businesses had equal access to lawyers as other business entities
do, and taking steps to avoid serious legal mishaps starts with giving lawyers the green
light to represent these businesses.
iv. So Now What? How Attorneys Can Ethically Manage Representing Marijuana
Businesses
What exactly should a lawyer tell a marijuana business client when its VWDWH¶V5XOHV
of Professional Conduct require the attorney to warn their client of the implications of
participating in a federally illegal industry? Is it sufficient that the attorney merely warn
the client of the illegal nature of the business from a federal law standpoint, and that the
client should be cautious of federal authorities investigating their activity? What about
questions the client has that pertain to circumventing federal investigations?
An appropriate approach for attorneys to take when providing legal services to
marijuana businesses would be one that adequately informs the client about the potential
consequences of engaging in the marijuana industry. Law firms that provide services for
marijuana businesses could utilize disclaimers in engagement letters that fully detail the
VHUYLFHVEHLQJSURYLGHGWRWKHFOLHQWH[SODLQWKHVFRSHRIWKHODZ\HU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQ HJ
that the lawyer will not be assisting them outside of transactional matters that are in full
compliance with state law), and that remind the client that possessing, using, distributing,
and selling marijuana are all federally illegal offenses. 154 Additionally, lawyers should
limit the scope of their representation to state law, and should spell out in plain meaning
that they will only assist or counsel the client with matters or activities that are in

151. Id. at 4.
152. OHIO RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.2(d)(2) (2016).
153. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
154. See, e.g., Daniel Shortt, The Ethical Marijuana Lawyer: Legal Issues, Federal Law And Policy, States,
HARRIS BRICKEN: CANNA LAW BLOG (Oct. 3, 2019), https://harrisbricken.com/cannalawblog/the-ethicalmarijuana-lawyer/.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons,

19

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 56 [], Iss. 1, Art. 8

TULSA LAW REVIEW

162

[Vol. 56:143

compliance with state law.155
v. Conflicts of Interest
Another significant issue facing lawyers who choose to represent marijuana
businesses, especially at large firms, is the potential for conflicts of interest with other
current clients. ABA Model Rule 1.7 addresses conflicts of interest and provides that a
FRQFXUUHQWFRQIOLFWRILQWHUHVWH[LVWVLIWKHODZ\HU¶VUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIRQHSDUW\ZRXOGEH
directly adverse to the other or if the dual representation would materially limit the
ODZ\HU¶VDELOLW\WRUHSUHVHQWRQHRIWKHFOLHQWV156 For example, suppose that a large firm
LQ D VWDWH WKDW MXVW OHJDOL]HG PDULMXDQD UHSUHVHQWV KXQGUHGV RI HPSOR\HUV 7KH ILUP¶V
services for an employer may include drafting and implementing the employer¶V
workplace policies²which include the drug use policies. Right after the state legalizes
marijuana, cannabis dispensaries show up in droves looking for legal services to help
facilitate the businHVVHV¶ VWDUW-up phase. A conflict of interest may arise if the firm
represents employers that are adverse parties to the marijuana business. Precisely, the
employers who have lawyer-created policies that allow them to fire employees who test
positive for marijuana do not want their employees patronizing the new marijuana
dispensary that seeks legal counsel from the same firm.157
7KH 0RGHO 5XOH¶V FRPPHQW VHFWLRQ HODERUDWHV IXUWKHU RQ WKH FRQFHSW DQG SROLF\
EHKLQGFRQIOLFWVRILQWHUHVWVHWWLQJIRUWKWKDW³>a] lawyer may not act as an advocate in one
matter against a person the lawyer represents in some other matter, even when the matters
DUH ZKROO\ XQUHODWHG´158 7KH VLJQLILFDQFH RI ³ZKROO\ XQUHODWHG´ LV PDQLIHVWHG LQ WKH
illustration above, because despite the fact that the matter in which the lawyer is
UHSUHVHQWLQJWKHPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVLVQRWGLUHFWO\UHODWHGWRWKHHPSOR\HU¶VGUXJSROLF\
WKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQVWLOOFLUFXPYHQWVERWKSDUWLHV¶LQWHUHVWs. The marijuana business has an
interest in attracting customers who can legally use marijuana to buy their products, but
the employer has a legitimate interest in preventing its employees from engaging in such
conduct.
Rule 1.7 also provides an exception where the lawyer may represent two clients
when the representation could bring about a conflict of interest if the following conditions
are satisfied: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes they will be able to provide competent and
diligent representation to each client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3)
the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against the other
client represented by the lawyer in the same proceeding; and (4) each client gives informed
consent, confirmed in writing.159
155. Id.
156. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.7(a) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
157. See H.B. 2612, 57th leg. (Okla. 2019) (The Unity Bill was Oklahoma¶s compromise for employers in
response to medical marijuana legalization. One provision of the Bill discusses employer¶s rights to fire
employees for drug use, and provides a lengthy, non-exhaustive list of ³safety sensitive´ jobs. Employees with
job duties that fall in to one of these categories, or that are perhaps parallel with one, may be terminated for cause
for using marijuana even if they have a state-issued medical marijuana card. Legislation like the Unity Bill can
send employers scrambling for their lawyers to ensure their policies are still valid. As discussed, conflicts of
interest can arise if the attorneys they consult are also representing marijuana dispensaries.).
158. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.7 cmt. 6 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
159. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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Applying these exception qualifications to the previous hypothetical, the lawyer at
a large firm could easily satisfy item (1) based on the amount of resources at large firms,
DQG WKH IDFW WKDW WKH ODZ\HU¶V VHUYLFHV ZRXOG QRW EH FRPSURPLVHG GXH WR WKH DUELWUDU\
conflict. Item (3) would not apply to this scenario because the matter would not involve a
claim being brought against an employer by a marijuana business or vice versa. However,
items (2) and (4) are more difficult to overcome.
Concerning item (2), operating a marijuana business is federally illegal. This
element still begs the question whether state law that conflicts with federal law is sufficient
to permit a lawyer to provide legal services to marijuana businesses.
With respect to item (4), a signed consent form that permits counseling and assisting
a client in an illegal activity would arguably be a non-enforceable contract, and therefore
would render the waiver invalid.160 This would be based on the basic contract law
principle that deems a contract formed with illegal activity as consideration
unenforceable.161 However, in order for such an agreement to be an illegal contract, it
must clearly and definitively be illegal from one of its terms in order to be considered
unenforceable.162 A contract that might potentially lead to illegal action, but does not
immediately involve illegal action would ultimately be considered a legal contract. 163 If
the contract is merely collaterally connected with an illegal purpose or act, the general rule
is that the contract is enforceable if it is only remotely connected with the illegal
transaction and rests on an independent and legal consideration.164 Additionally, the
contract is enforceable as long as the plaintiff can establish their case without relying on
the illegal transaction.165
The hypothetical at issue is squarely in line with this. The terms of the waiver on its
face would not expressly provide such illegal conduct as consideration, or due to the
DJUHHPHQW¶V WHUPV LPPHGLDWHO\ WULJJHU LOOHJDO FRQGXFW $ EHWWHU H[DPSOH RI DQ LOOHJal
contract would be if the marijuana business paid the lawyer with marijuana IRUWKHODZ\HU¶V
services.
In sum, a waiver signed by both parties in a scenario like this hypothetical would
likely be enforceable. The significance of this result is that parties with such an abstract
and arguably indirect conflict could still have access to legal services of their choice upon
providing informed consent to the attorney in writing.166
vi. Entrepreneur Attorneys: Should Attorneys Be Allowed to Participate in StateLegalized Marijuana Industries?
Another question that would likely prompt most attorneys to reflect on their ethical
obligations is whether they are allowed to participate in a state-legalized marijuana
160. But see RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §19:11 (4th ed. 2003).
161. See id.
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. LORD, supra note 160, at 1; see also generally Mann v. Gullickson, No. 15-cv-03630-MEJ, WL 6473215
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016) (holding contracts that involve consulting services and pertain to marijuana business
are enforceable).
165. LORD, supra note 160, at 1.
166. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.7(b)(4) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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industry. The Washington Opinion provides that lawyers are generally free to engage in
business to the same extent as other members of the general public, and because the lawyer
participating in a state-OHJDOPDULMXDQDEXVLQHVVLVVHSDUDWHIURPWKHODZ\HU¶VSUDFWLFHRI
law, there would be no reason to prohibit the lawyer from participating in the market as
long as their operations are in compliance with state law and the Rules of Professional
Conduct.167
The Washington Opinion arguably ignores key provisions of Rule 8.4, one of which
provides that disregard for the rule of law and criminal acts reflecting adversely on
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice are not in compliance with the Rules of
Ethics.168
Additionally, the Rule provides that breaching the oath of office²swearing to abide
by both state and federal law²is against the Rules of Professional Conduct, as is conduct
demonstrating unfitness to practice law, and acts involving moral turpitude, or
corruption.169 Because marijuana is federally illegal, a lawyer engaging in the cannabis
market could arguably be violating Rule 8.4.170
Nonetheless, the Washington Opinion rebutted this argument and opined that it
would be inappropriate to interpret Rule 8.4 in a way that would define engaging in
business permitted by state law as an act demonstrating character that is unfit to practice
law.171 The opinion emphasized that until there is a change in federal enforcement policy
WKDWZRXOGSXWWKH6WDWH¶VOHJDOL]HGPDULMXDQDLQGXVWU\DWULVNODZ\HUVPD\HQMR\WKHVDPH
freedoms as other members of society to participate in the market.172 The Washington
Opinion demonstrates its commitment to taking a progressive approach to the Rules of
Professional Conduct by interpreting matters of law in light of what is permissible under
state law, even if it conflicts with federal law.
But what if an attorney wants to enter a marijuana business with one of its clients?
Rule 1.8 provides that attorneys should not enter into business with a client, or knowingly
acquire a pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless: (1) the transaction and terms are
both fair and reasonable and are fully disclosed in writing in a way that can be reasonably
understood by the client; (2) the client is advised in writing that they have the ability to
seek independent legal counsel on the transaction, and that doing so might be best for the
client; and (3) the client gives informed, written consent to the essential terms of the
WUDQVDFWLRQDQGWKHODZ\HU¶VUROHLQLWLQFOXGLQJZKHWKHUWKHODZ\HULVUHSUHVHQWLQJWKH
client in the transaction.173
Maintaining its progressive approach to the Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Washington Opinion noted that a lawyer going in to a marijuana business with a client,
ZKLOHDFWLQJLQFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVWDWHODZZRXOGQRWFRQVWLWXWHHLWKHUD³FULPLQDODFWWKDt
UHIOHFWVDGYHUVHO\RQWKHODZ\HU¶VKRQHVW\WUXVWZRUWKLQHVVRUILWQHVVDVDODZ\HULQRWKHU
UHVSHFWV´ RU DQ ³DFW LQYROYLQJ PRUDO WXUSLWXGHRU FRUUXSWLRQ RU DQ\XQMXVWLILHG DFW RI
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Wash. State Bar $VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2SDW  
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 8.4 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
See Wash. State Bar $VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2S  .
Id. at 7.
See :DVK6WDWH%DU$VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2S  
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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DVVDXOWRURWKHUDFWZKLFKUHIOHFWVGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHUXOHRIODZ´ 174
In sum, the Washington OSLQLRQ¶V LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ DQG HQIRUFHPHQW RI WKH 0RGHO
Rules of Professional Conduct provide attorneys substantial freedom to represent
marijuana businesses as clients and participate in state-legalized cannabis markets.175 This
interpretation and enforcement of the rules is beneficial in multiple ways. First, it provides
marijuana businesses the same freedom and ability to obtain legal representation as other
legal business entities do in their respective states. Second, it promotes opportunity for
development and growth in a new and evolving area of law by affording attorneys the
opportunity to represent these businesses as clients. And lastly, allowing attorneys to
represent marijuana businesses is beneficial to the CSA enforcement priorities. With
adequate legal representation and sound legal advice, marijuana business owners will be
more informed on the law and more cognizant of their conduct. And as a result of the
benefits from obtaining legal services, marijuana businesses will be more likely to refrain
from committing serious federal offenses such as: selling to minors, trafficking across state
lines, and establishing ties with criminal enterprises.
Because the Rules of Professional Conduct are meant to be rules of reason with an
underlying motive to provide access to the best legal representation possible, the
Washington standard adequately addresses the needs of marijuana businesses that are
predisposed to a wide variety of legal and regulatory issues.176
IV. OKLAHOMA CAN FURTHER THE OBJECTIVES OF THE MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT BY TAKING A ³CLIENT-CENTRIC´ APPROACH WHEN
APPLYING THE RULES TO THE MEDICAL MARIJUANA INDUSTRY
Oklahoma should take a ³client-centric´ approach when applying the Rules of
Professional Conduct to attorneys representing medical marijuana businesses because
doing so would improve access to the legal system and the quality of services that the legal
profession provides to the public.177 Interpreting and enforcing the Rules of Professional
Conduct in a ZD\WKDWUHVWULFWVDFFHVVWRRXUOHJDOV\VWHPLVFRXQWHULQWXLWLYHWRWKH$%$¶V
objective to improve access to the legal system. 178 The Rules are intended to facilitate
SUDFWLFHVWKDWHQVXUHWKHOHJDOSURIHVVLRQ¶VUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVDUHFDWHUHGWRDQGGLVFKDrged
in the public interest.179 Since Oklahomans voted to legalize medical marijuana, it seems
improbable that the will of the public is to afford marijuana businesses a fraction of the
legal access that other businesses are afforded. The ABA Committee holds the Rules of
3URIHVVLRQDO &RQGXFW RXW WR EH ³UXOHV RI UHDVRQ´ 180 and it is entirely unreasonable to
OHJDOL]HDQHYROYLQJLQGXVWU\RQO\WRVXEVHTXHQWO\UHVWULFWLQGXVWU\SDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFFHVVWR

174. The assertion that attorneys should be able to participate in the marijuana industry does not mean that all
attorneys should be able to. For example, a prosecutor participating in the industry would probably trigger more
conflicts under Rule 1.7 than a general practitioner would. See Wash. State Bar $VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2S
(2015).
175. Id.
176. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
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lawyers. Because it is the duty of the Profession to create policy that furthers the public
interest, it would be best for Oklahoma to take a ³client-centric´ stance when applying
Model Rule 1.2(d) to medical marijuana businesses.
Oklahoma could achieve this end by writing an ethics opinion or implementing a
series of modifications to the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct. If Oklahoma
issues a formal opinion, it should provide that attorneys may render legal services
SHUWDLQLQJWRWKH6WDWH¶VPDULMXDQDODZVDQGUHJXODWLRQV$GGLWLRQDOO\WKHRSLQLRQVKRXOG
deem it permissible for attorneys to assist medical marijuana businesses with transactional
work, and any other conduct that the attorney reasonably believes is permitted by
Oklahoma law, orders, regulations, or any other state and local provisions.
Although it would be best for Oklahoma to require attorneys to advise their
marijuana business clients about the implications of state and federal law conflicts, it is
not entirely necessary. Such a requirement would essentially be encapsulated by Rule 1.1,
which requires a lawyer to provide competent representation to a client. 181 One of the
necessary components of competent representation is adequate legal knowledge.182
Additionally, Model Rule 1.4 requires an attorney to explain the law to clients to the extent
necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions. 183 These two ABA Model
Rules read together arguably require an attorney to inform a client about the implications
of federal law when representing a marijuana business. An attorney would probably breach
their duty owed to their client by failing to do so. On balance, any modification to the
Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct should include language that requires attorneys
representing medical marijuana businesses to advise them on the implications of federal
and state law conflict.
Additionally, any rule modification or ethics opinion should support the notion that
Oklahoma attorneys may enjoy the same opportunity to participate in the marijuana
industry as everyday citizens are afforded, so long as their participation does not create
conflicts of interest with clients and is in compliance with state law and regulations.184 An
attorney¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ in the marijuana industry, whether as a business-person or a
consumer, would not constitute an act WKDW UHIOHFWV DGYHUVHO\ RQ WKH ODZ\HU¶V KRQHVW\
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Such participation would not be an act of moral
turpitude, corruption, or any other unjustified act that reflects poorly on the legal
profession or depicts the attorQH\¶VGLVUHJDUGIRUWKHUXOHRIODZ2NODKRPDVKRXOGUHIUDLQ
from taking any stance that would suggest otherwise.
V.

CONCLUSION

7KH $%$ FRPPLWWHH GHVFULEHG WKH 5XOHV RI 3URIHVVLRQDO &RQGXFW DV ³UXOHV RI
UHDVRQ´DQGHVWDEOLVKHGWKDWRQHRIWKHOHJDOSURIHVVLRQ¶VSULPDU\REMHFWLYHVLVWRFUHDWH
policy conceived in the public interest.185 Oklahoma can further these principles by taking
action to eliminate the ethical gray area that dazes attorneys looking to represent medical
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT r. 1.4(b) (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
See :DVK6WDWH%DU$VV¶Q$GYLVRU\2S  
MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
See Shortt, supra note 154.
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marijuana businesses, or even participate in the industry.
Although state ethics opinions merely serve as a set of guidelines that provide
attorneys no shield from federal enforcement,186 a set of guidelines is better than silence
in light of the enormous ethical gray area created by opportunities for attorneys to represent
marijuana businesses. And while attorneys gain no federal legal protection when their state
modifies its Rules of Professional Conduct²DQDWWRUQH\¶VDELOLW\WRDVFHUWDLQWKHVWDWH¶V
stance on and interpretation of the Rules will give them one less thing to worry about on
WKHMRE7DNLQJDVWDQFHWKDWFODULILHVDWWRUQH\V¶HWKLFDOGXWLHVZLOOXQGRXEWHGO\DOORZWKHP
to focus their efforts on increasing access to the legal system, providing the best legal
services possible, and becoming better advocates for medical marijuana businesses that
deserve a full menu of legal services²all of which squarely align with the underlying
objectives of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 187
The people of Oklahoma spoke loud and clear when they voted to pass State
Question 788. And for all of the aforementioned reasons, the Oklahoma Ethics Committee
and Oklahoma Supreme Court should allow a growing industry to fully blossom by using
this opportunity to endorse the voice of the Oklahoma constituents and eliminate the
inconvenient ethical haze pestering attorneys that represent medical marijuana businesses.
- Jay Kendrick*

186. See MODEL RULES OF PROF¶L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope (AM. BAR ASS¶N 1983).
187. Id.
*
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